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Abstract— It is a long-standing goal of artificial intelligence
(AI) to be superior to human beings in decision making.
Games are suitable for testing AI capabilities of making good
decisions in non-numerical tasks. In this paper, we develop a
new AI algorithm to play the penny-matching game considered
in Shannon’s “mind-reading machine” (1953) against human
players. In particular, we exploit cognitive hierarchy theory
and Bayesian learning techniques to continually evolve a model
for predicting human player decisions, and let the AI player
make decisions according to the model predictions to pursue
the best chance of winning. Experimental results show that our
AI algorithm beats 27 out of 30 volunteer human players.
I. INTRODUCTION
Developing artificial intelligence (AI) to beat humans
in strategic games has been drawing attention/interest of
researchers for decades [1]–[10]. Although AI algorithms
targeted at specific games may not directly contribute to
solving practical engineering problems other than those in
the gambling industry, the theories developed alongside can
be used to attack many problems of similar natures and of
greater significance [1].
Many strategic games, for example, the games of chess,
Go, and poker, require the players to do intensive calcula-
tions to identify winning strategies. AI algorithms for these
games often rely on the super computing power of modern
computers to beat human players [2]–[5]. In many other
strategic games, computing power may have a less decisive
effect on the game result. For instance, this holds for the
cases where perfectly rational decision strategies are well-
known, including the game of matching pennies (or “odds
and evens”) [11] and the game of rock-paper-scissors [12].
For such games, recognizing the decision pattern of the
opponent human player often plays a vital role in developing
winning strategies for the AI player [6]–[10].
In this paper, we focus on the game of matching pennies.
We develop an AI to play the game repeatedly against a
human player, during which the AI decision strategy is
continually evolved to pursue the best chance of winning.
Such a problem has been considered by C. E. Shannon
in his seminal paper [6], where he named his AI a “mind-
reading machine,” followed by D. W. Hagelbarger in [7],
where the AI won 5, 218 times out of 9, 795 plays. The prin-
ciple behind their AI algorithms is the hypothesis that human
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players are not able to generate i.i.d.1 random numbers but
tend to follow certain patterns depending on the previous
results to make their new decisions. Their AI algorithms
pursue the identification of these patterns and assume that
the human player will follow the same patterns the next time
the same situation arises. Some later works, including [8]–
[10] for the game of rock-paper-scissors, essentially follow
the same principle to design their AI algorithms.
In this paper, we propose a new AI algorithm, which
leverages cognitive hierarchy theory [13]–[15] and Bayesian
learning. We also hypothesize that human players follow cer-
tain “patterns” in making decisions, but differently from [6]
and [7], we explicitly characterize these “patterns” based on
the human player’s “level of reasoning,” introduced in cogni-
tive hierarchy theory. Furthermore, we assume that humans
follow these patterns probabilistically, and use Bayesian
learning techniques to identify the associated probabilities.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are:
1) We develop a new AI algorithm to play the penny-
matching game, which beats 90% of volunteer human players
in our experiments.
2) Our algorithm exploits the level-k framework [13], [14]
of cognitive hierarchy theory, which has not been considered
in previously developed AI algorithms for matching-penny
or rock-paper-scissors games [6]–[10].
3) Although cognitive hierarchy theory has been exploited
for modeling human-agent behavior in some other applica-
tion domains, such as automotive [16], [17], aerospace [18],
and cyber-physical security [19] applications, probabilistic
reasoning-level transitions in sequential decision-making sce-
narios, considered in this paper, have not been incorporated
in these previous works. And the results of this paper suggest
that such reasoning-level transitions exist in human decision
making and can be modeled.
4) In the light of 3), we envision that the general approach
to modeling human behavior proposed in this paper can
find its utility in a broader range of application scenarios
involving human-machine interactions.
II. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE
PENNY-MATCHING GAME
The penny-matching game under consideration, denoted
by G, is a two-player zero-sum game with the normal-form
representation given in Table I. Formally, let ui denote a
decision of player i, i ∈ P = {1, 2}, taking values in the
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set U = {0, 1}. The payoffs of the two players, (r1, r2), as
functions of (u1, u2) are defined as follows:
r1 = 1− 2 mod(u1 + u2, 2), (1a)
r2 = −r1. (1b)
Player 1
Player 2
0 1
0 (1,−1) (−1, 1)
1 (−1, 1) (1,−1)
TABLE I
GAME IN NORMAL-FORM REPRESENTATION.
We let a human player, as player 1, and an artificial
intelligence (AI), as player 2, play the game G repeatedly.
For convenience, we use the subscript t ∈ N ∪ {0} to
denote the round of the game. For instance, u1t denotes the
human player’s decision for game round t, and r1t denotes
her obtained payoff in this round.
If rit > 0, then we say that player i wins the round t. It is
easily seen from (1) that there is always one and only one
of the two players winning a round. Our goal is to design a
strategy for the AI so that it has a higher winning rate than
the human player, where the winning rate is defined as the
number of wins divided by the total number of game rounds.
It is clear from (1) that if the human player’s decision u1t
can be correctly predicted, the AI can win the round t by
using the following decision strategy:
u2t = 1− uˆ1t , (2)
where uˆ1t denotes the predicted value of u
1
t .
Therefore, the goal to win can be achieved through devel-
oping a model of the human player that can predict u1t with
high accuracy.
It is well-known that the above repeated game has a unique
Nash equilibrium, which involves independent repetition of
the stage-game equilibrium strategy, i.e., for each player to
play according to an i.i.d process where at each stage 0 or 1
is chosen with equal probability 0.5. We call this the Nash-
equilibrium strategy for G. In particular, as long as one of
the two players applies this Nash-equilibrium strategy, the
game will end in a draw in expectation.
III. MODELING HUMAN PLAYER BASED ON COGNITIVE
HIERARCHY THEORY
A. Level-k models of the human player
Cognitive hierarchy theory (CHT) characterizes human
decision-making processes based on assumptions of bounded
rationality and iterated reasoning. In the level-k framework of
CHT, a human decision-maker is assumed to make decisions
based on a finite number of reasoning steps, called “level.”
In the setting of single-shot games, in particular, a level-
k player assumes that the other player(s) are level-(k − 1),
predicts their decisions based on this assumption, and makes
her own decision as the optimal response to the predicted
decisions of the other players [13], [14].
In order to formulate the level-k, k = 0, 1, . . . , decision
strategies of the two players in our game G, we start from
defining the level-0 decision rules of the two players as
follows:
uˆ1,0t = u
2
t−1, (3a)
uˆ2,0t = 1− u1t−1. (3b)
The above level-0 decision rules are based on the “naive”
thought that the other player will make the same decision
as in the previous round, which may represent a player’s
instinctive response to the game.
On the basis of the level-0 decision rules (3), the level-k
decision rules of the two players, with k ≥ 1, are as follows:
uˆ1,kt = uˆ
2,k−1
t , (4a)
uˆ2,kt = 1− uˆ1,k−1t , (4b)
i.e., the level-k decision of player i optimally responds to the
level-(k−1) decision of player (3−i) in terms of maximizing
player i’s own payoff.
For a given pair (u1t−1, u
2
t−1) ∈ U × U , the level-k deci-
sions of the two players for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , are summarized
in Table II, where we use [κ] to denote the set of non-negative
integers κ′ that satisfy mod(κ′, 4) = κ.
We let σt ∈ N ∪ {0} denote the human player’s level of
reasoning for round t. In principle, if σt ∈ [κ] for some κ =
0, 1, 2 or 3, then u1t is determined as u
1
t = uˆ
1,σt
t = uˆ
1,[κ]
t ,
which can be read from Table II. However, to account for
the sub-optimality and variability in human decision making,
we assume that if σt ∈ [κ], then the human player makes
decisions according to
P(u1t = uˆ
1,σt
t ) =
eθ
eθ + e−θ
, (5a)
P(u1t = 1− uˆ1,σtt ) =
e−θ
eθ + e−θ
, (5b)
which is based on the “softmax” decision rule [20] with θ >
0 being a tuning parameter.
k
Player
1 2
[0] u2t−1 1− u1t−1
[1] 1− u1t−1 1− u2t−1
[2] 1− u2t−1 u1t−1
[3] u1t−1 u
2
t−1
TABLE II
LEVEL-k DECISIONS OF PLAYERS 1 AND 2.
B. Transitions of human player’s reasoning level
In a single-shot game, a player has only one chance to
determine her reasoning level, relying on which to make her
decision. In a repeated game, in contrast, a player can adjust
her level in each round, for instance, according to whether
she is winning or losing.
We assume that the human player in our repeated game
G will probabilistically adjust her reasoning level in each
round according to the game result of the previous round, in
particular, based on the following transition model,
P(σt ∈ [i] |σt−1 ∈ [j], r1t−1 = 1) = p+(i+1),(j+1), (6a)
P(σt ∈ [i] |σt−1 ∈ [j], r1t−1 = −1) = p−(i+1),(j+1), (6b)
defined for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, where P(·|·) represents
conditional probabilities.
However, due to the fact that different humans may have
different transition models, the transition matrices p+, p− ∈
{p ∈ [0, 1]4×4 | ∑4i=1 pi,j = 1, j = 1, 2, 3, 4} are not a priori
known, but have to be estimated during the game. Note that
there are 12 unknown parameters for each of p+ and p−,
which poses a requirement of a large set of data for their
estimation.
Therefore, we pursue a simplification of the transition
model (6) by leveraging the following two observations:
1) If the human player won the previous round, i.e.,
u1t−1 = u
2
t−1, then uˆ
1,[0]
t = uˆ
1,[3]
t and uˆ
1,[1]
t = uˆ
1,[2]
t .
2) If the human player lost the previous round, i.e., u1t−1 =
1− u2t−1, then uˆ1,[0]t = uˆ1,[1]t and uˆ1,[2]t = uˆ1,[3]t .
In other words, to predict the human player’s action for the
next round, there is no need to distinguish her level between
[0] and [3], and between [1] and [2] if she won the previous
round. And similarly, there is no need to distinguish her level
between [0] and [1], and between [2] and [3] if she lost the
previous round.
On the basis of the above observations, we consider a
simplified transition model as follows:
P(σt ∈ Σ+1 |σt−1 ∈ Σ+1 , r1t−1 = 1) = q+1 , (7a)
P(σt ∈ Σ+2 |σt−1 ∈ Σ+2 , r1t−1 = 1) = q+2 , (7b)
P(σt ∈ Σ−1 |σt−1 ∈ Σ−1 , r1t−1 = −1) = q−1 , (7c)
P(σt ∈ Σ−2 |σt−1 ∈ Σ−2 , r1t−1 = −1) = q−2 , (7d)
where Σ+1 = {[0], [3]}, Σ+2 = {[1], [2]}, Σ−1 = {[0], [1]}, and
Σ−2 = {[2], [3]}. Note that the probabilistic transitions from
Σ+1 to Σ
+
2 and from Σ
+
2 to Σ
+
1 under r
1
t−1 = 1 as well as
those from Σ−1 to Σ
−
2 and from Σ
−
2 to Σ
−
1 under r
1
t−1 = −1
can be computed based on the law of total probability. For
instance, P(σt ∈ Σ+2 |σt−1 ∈ Σ+1 , r1t−1 = 1) = 1 − q+1 .
Furthermore, we assume that the probability of the event
σt ∈ Σ±i conditioned on σt−1 ∈ Σ±j and r1t−1 = ±1 is
independent of all other events for every pair of i, j ∈ {0, 1}.
Suppose that σt−1, as well as q+1 , q
+
2 , q
−
1 and q
−
2 , is
known. Then, depending on r1t−1 = 1 or −1, the probabilities
of set membership σt ∈ Σ+1 and σt ∈ Σ+2 , or the probabilities
of σt ∈ Σ−1 and σt ∈ Σ−2 can be computed, based on
which uˆ1,σtt can be probabilistically predicted. Indeed, when
the exact values of (σt−1, q+1 , q
+
2 , q
−
1 , q
−
2 ) are not known, a
distribution on {[0], [1], [2], [3]} × [0, 1]4 characterizing the
probability of (σt−1, q+1 , q
+
2 , q
−
1 , q
−
2 ) taking each value of{[0], [1], [2], [3]} × [0, 1]4 is sufficient for the above compu-
tation and prediction. Specifically, let pit−1 denote such a
probability distribution, then
P(σt ∈ Σ+1 ) =
∫
Σ+1 ×[0,1]4
q+1 dpit−1 +
∫
Σ+2 ×[0,1]4
(1− q+2 ) dpit−1,
(8)
if r1t−1 = 1, and
P(σt ∈ Σ−1 ) =
∫
Σ−1 ×[0,1]4
q−1 dpit−1 +
∫
Σ−2 ×[0,1]4
(1− q−2 ) dpit−1,
(9)
if r1t−1 = −1.
To facilitate numerical implementation, we assume that
q±i takes values in a finite set Q ⊂ [0, 1], where Q can be a
grid on [0, 1]. In this case, the probability distribution pit−1
is discrete, and the formula becomes
P(σt ∈ Σ+1 ) =
∑
q+1 ∈Q
q+1
( ∑
σ∈Σ+1
∑
q+2 ∈Q
∑
q−1 ∈Q
∑
q−2 ∈Q
pit−1(σ, q
+
1 , q
+
2 , q
−
1 , q
−
2 )
)
+
∑
q+2 ∈Q
(1− q+2 )
(
∑
σ∈Σ+2
∑
q+1 ∈Q
∑
q−1 ∈Q
∑
q−2 ∈Q
pit−1(σ, q
+
1 , q
+
2 , q
−
1 , q
−
2 )
)
, (10)
if r1t−1 = 1, and
P(σt ∈ Σ−1 ) =
∑
q−1 ∈Q
q−1
( ∑
σ∈Σ−1
∑
q−2 ∈Q
∑
q+1 ∈Q
∑
q+2 ∈Q
pit−1(σ, q
+
1 , q
+
2 , q
−
1 , q
−
2 )
)
+
∑
q−2 ∈Q
(1− q−2 )
(
∑
σ∈Σ−2
∑
q−1 ∈Q
∑
q+1 ∈Q
∑
q+2 ∈Q
pit−1(σ, q
+
1 , q
+
2 , q
−
1 , q
−
2 )
)
, (11)
if r1t−1 = −1.
C. Bayesian learning of human player’s model
On the basis of Sections III-A and III-B, the human
player’s behavior is modeled based on two parts: her
reasoning level σt for each round t and the parameters
(q+1 , q
+
2 , q
−
1 , q
−
2 ) characterizing her reasoning level transi-
tions. Unfortunately, these variables/parameters are neither a
priori known nor directly observable. What can be observed
are the human player’s decision for each round, u1t , and the
game result for each round, r1t . Note that given (u
1
t , r
1
t ),
the knowledge of u2t and r
2
t is redundant since they can be
computed using (u1t , r
1
t ) and (1).
We will use Bayesian learning techniques to learn
xt = (σt, q
+
1 , q
+
2 , q
−
1 , q
−
2 ) from the observable data ξt =
{u10, . . . , u1t , r10, . . . , r1t }. Specifically, we pursue a probabil-
ity distribution on {[0], [1], [2], [3]} ×Q4, characterizing our
belief about the value of xt, i.e., the pit defined at the end
of Section III-B, conditioned on the available data ξt.
To achieve this, we rely on a hidden Markov chain for-
mulation and its corresponding recursive Bayesian inference
formula as follows:
If r1t = 1, then we have
pit(Σ
+
1 × {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 }) =
P(u1t |σt ∈ Σ+1 ) Π+t−1∑
qˆ∈Q4
(
P(u1t |σt ∈ Σ+1 ) Πˆ+t−1,1 + P(u1t |σt ∈ Σ+2 ) Πˆ+t−1,2
)
(12)
where
∑
qˆ∈Q4 =
∑
qˆ+1 ∈Q
∑
qˆ+2 ∈Q
∑
qˆ−1 ∈Q
∑
qˆ−2 ∈Q, and
Π+t−1 = q
+
1 pit−1(Σ
+
1 × {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 })
+ (1− q+2 )pit−1(Σ+2 × {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 }), (13a)
Πˆ+t−1,1 = qˆ
+
1 pit−1(Σ
+
1 × {qˆ+1 , qˆ+2 , qˆ−1 , qˆ−2 })
+ (1− qˆ+2 )pit−1(Σ+2 × {qˆ+1 , qˆ+2 , qˆ−1 , qˆ−2 }), (13b)
Πˆ+t−1,2 = (1− qˆ+1 )pit−1(Σ+1 × {qˆ+1 , qˆ+2 , qˆ−1 , qˆ−2 })
+ qˆ+2 pit−1(Σ
+
2 × {qˆ+1 , qˆ+2 , qˆ−1 , qˆ−2 }), (13c)
and based on (5),
P(u1t |σt ∈ Σ+1 ) =
{
eθ
eθ+e−θ if u
1
t = uˆ
1,[0]
t (= uˆ
1,[3]
t ),
e−θ
eθ+e−θ if u
1
t = uˆ
1,[1]
t (= uˆ
1,[2]
t ),
P(u1t |σt ∈ Σ+2 ) =
{
e−θ
eθ+e−θ if u
1
t = uˆ
1,[0]
t (= uˆ
1,[3]
t ),
eθ
eθ+e−θ if u
1
t = uˆ
1,[1]
t (= uˆ
1,[2]
t ).
(14)
Similarly, if r1t = −1, then we have
pit(Σ
−
1 × {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 }) =
P(u1t |σt ∈ Σ−1 ) Π−t−1∑
qˆ∈Q4 P(u1t |σt ∈ Σ−1 ) Πˆ−t−1,1 + P(u1t |σt ∈ Σ−2 ) Πˆ−t−1,2
(15)
where
Π−t−1 = q
−
1 pit−1(Σ
−
1 × {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 })
+ (1− q−2 )pit−1(Σ−2 × {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 }), (16a)
Πˆ−t−1,1 = qˆ
−
1 pit−1(Σ
−
1 × {qˆ+1 , qˆ+2 , qˆ−1 , qˆ−2 })
+ (1− qˆ−2 )pit−1(Σ−2 × {qˆ+1 , qˆ+2 , qˆ−1 , qˆ−2 }), (16b)
Πˆ−t−1,2 = (1− qˆ−1 )pit−1(Σ−1 × {qˆ+1 , qˆ+2 , qˆ−1 , qˆ−2 })
+ qˆ−2 pit−1(Σ
−
2 × {qˆ+1 , qˆ+2 , qˆ−1 , qˆ−2 }), (16c)
and based on (5),
P(u1t |σt ∈ Σ−1 ) =
{
eθ
eθ+e−θ if u
1
t = uˆ
1,[0]
t (= uˆ
1,[1]
t ),
e−θ
eθ+e−θ if u
1
t = uˆ
1,[2]
t (= uˆ
1,[3]
t ),
P(u1t |σt ∈ Σ−2 ) =
{
e−θ
eθ+e−θ if u
1
t = uˆ
1,[0]
t (= uˆ
1,[1]
t ),
eθ
eθ+e−θ if u
1
t = uˆ
1,[2]
t (= uˆ
1,[3]
t ).
(17)
Note that in computing (13) or (16), we need to use
pit−1, the belief distribution of xt−1 on {[0], [1], [2], [3]}×Q4
conditioned on the available data ξt−1. However, (12) or
(15) only provides us with partial information of pit, that is,
pit(Σ
+
1 × {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 }) or pit(Σ−1 × {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 }).
Note that pit(Σ+2 × {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 }) = 1 − pit(Σ+1 ×
{q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 }) and pit(Σ−2 × {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 }) = 1 −
pit(Σ
−
1 × {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 }).
To make the propagation (12) or (15) (which one is used
depends on the game result r1t ) recursively computable for
all t, we need to reconstruct the distribution pit from the
partial information pit(Σ+1 × {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 }) or pit(Σ−1 ×{q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 }). To do so, we rely on the following
assumptions:
pit([i]× {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 }) : pit([j]× {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 }) =
pit−1([i]× {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 }) : pit−1([j]× {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 })
(18)
holds for the pairs (i, j) = ([0], [3]) and (i, j) = ([1], [2])
if r1t = 1, and holds for the pairs (i, j) = ([0], [1]) and
(i, j) = ([2], [3]) if r1t = −1, and for all {q+1 , q+2 , q−1 , q−2 } ∈
Q4, meaning that our relative degree of belief in any two
indistinguishable2 levels follows its previous value.
On the basis of (12), (15), and (18), pit can be computed
using pit−1, u1t , and r
1
t for all t.
IV. DECISION STRATEGY FOR THE AI PLAYER
Using the algorithm (12)-(18), after each round t − 1,
we can obtain a belief distribution pit−1 characterizing the
human player’s model. Then, we compute P(σt ∈ Σ+1 ) and
P(σt ∈ Σ+2 ) = 1 − P(σt ∈ Σ+1 ) using (10) if r1t−1 = 1, or
compute P(σt ∈ Σ−1 ) and P(σt ∈ Σ−2 ) = 1 − P(σt ∈ Σ−1 )
using (11) if r1t−1 = −1.
Suppose that σt is known. Then, we let the AI mimic a
human player’s decision strategy, i.e., a “softmax” decision
rule similar to (5) as follows:
P(u2t = 1− uˆ1,σtt |σt) =
eθ
eθ + e−θ
, (19a)
P(u2t = uˆ
1,σt
t |σt) =
e−θ
eθ + e−θ
, (19b)
with θ > 0 being the same parameter as in (5). We
remark that although the AI does not need to mimic the
sub-optimality in human decision making, the strategy (19)
creates some randomness in AI decisions, making it harder
for the human player to identify the decision algorithm
behind the AI, while guaranteeing that the probability of
winning is higher than 0.5.
Since σt is not exactly known, we let the AI make
decisions relying on the predicted distribution of σt as
follows:
If r1t−1 = 1, then uˆ
1,[0]
t = uˆ
1,[3]
t = u
2
t−1, and we let
P(u2t = u2t−1)
=
∑
σt∈{[0],[1],[2],[3]}
P(u2t = u2t−1|σt)P(σt)
=
∑
σt∈{[0],[3]}
e−θ
eθ + e−θ
P(σt) +
∑
σt∈{[1],[2]}
eθ
eθ + e−θ
P(σt)
=
e−θ
eθ + e−θ
P(σt ∈ Σ+1 ) + e
θ
eθ + e−θ
P(σt ∈ Σ+2 )
=
eθ
eθ + e−θ
− e
θ − e−θ
eθ + e−θ
P(σt ∈ Σ+1 ). (20)
Similarly, if r1t−1 = −1, then uˆ1,[0]t = uˆ1,[1]t = u2t−1, and
we let
P(u2t = u2t−1) =
eθ
eθ + e−θ
− e
θ − e−θ
eθ + e−θ
P(σt ∈ Σ−1 ). (21)
In turn, P(u2t = 1− u2t−1) = 1− P(u2t = u2t−1).
2In terms of corresponding to identical uˆ1,σtt .
V. RESULTS
A. Game GUI
We design a Graphic User Interface (GUI), shown in
Fig. 1, to represent the game G. In each round, the human
player makes a decision between left or right to dig and the
AI player makes a decision between left or right to hide the
treasure. The human player gains one virtual coin (r1t = 1) if
both players choose the same side, and loses one (r1t = −1)
otherwise. The decisions of the two players for the current
round are displayed once both decisions have been made and
until the human player has made her decision for the next
round. The accumulated payoff of the human player up to the
current round t, i.e.,
∑t
k=1 r
1
k, is shown in the top-middle.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Game GUI. (a) The human player and the AI player both choose the
right side, and thus the human player wins; (b) The human player chooses
the left side and the AI player chooses the right side, and thus the human
player loses.
B. Results
We recruit human volunteers to play the game against the
AI player. In particular, we let each human participant play
the game two times, each time with 150 rounds. In one of the
two game-runs, the AI uses our proposed strategy leveraging
cognitive hierarchy theory and Bayesian learning, described
in Sections III and IV. In the algorithm (12)-(21), we use the
parameters Q = {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9} and θ = 1.5. In the
other game-run, the AI uses a Nash-equilibrium strategy, i.e.,
randomly chooses between left or right with equal probability
in each round. The order of these two strategies used in
the two game-runs is randomly determined and the human
participant knows neither the decision algorithms behind the
AI, nor the fact that the AI uses different strategies in the
two game-runs.
We have collected data of 30 human participants. We
plot the evolution of accumulated payoff of the AI player
as the game progresses,
∑t
k=1 r
2
k = −
∑t
k=1 r
1
k, in Fig. 2.
The thick blue line represents the mean and the light blue
shaded area represents the 95% confidence tube of the data
for the game-run with our proposed strategy. The thick
orange line represents the mean and the light orange shaded
area represents the 95% confidence tube of the data for
the game-runs with the Nash-equilibrium strategy. It can be
observed that when the AI uses our proposed strategy, its
accumulated payoff keeps increasing as the game progresses.
In contrast, when the AI uses the Nash-equilibrium strategy,
its accumulated payoff remains close to 0. This observation
verifies the fact that as long as one of the two players applies
such a Nash-equilibrium strategy, i.e., chooses between left
or right with equal probability in each round, the game will
end in a draw in expectation.
Fig. 2. The evolution of accumulated payoff of the AI player against
human players.
Fig. 3 shows the histogram of accumulated payoffs after
150 rounds,
∑150
t=1 r
1
t , of the 30 human participants corre-
sponding to their game-runs where the AI uses our proposed
strategy. It can be observed that the AI using our proposed
strategy beats 90% of the human players.
Fig. 3. The histogram of accumulated payoffs of human players against
the AI player using our proposed strategy.
Finally, we are interested in the results when player 1 can
be perfectly modeled by our proposed human player’s model
incorporating level-k reasoning and probabilistic reasoning
level transitions. Therefore, we create a “fake human” by
letting her make decisions according to the “softmax level-k
decision rules” defined by (5) and Table II in each round,
with her reasoning level σt probabilistically transitioned
according to the transition model defined by (7) and (18)
between consecutive rounds, i.e., a model that perfectly
satisfies all of our assumptions. In particular, we randomly
generate the values for q+1 , q
+
2 , q
−
1 , and q
−
2 according to
uniform distributions on [0, 1].
We plot in Figs. 4 and 5 the same results as the ones
of Figs. 2 and 3 but with the data of real human players
replaced by the data generated by “fake human” players.
We remark that the q+1 , q
+
2 , q
−
1 , q
−
2 values are regenerated
for each new game-run, thus their values may be different
for different game-runs, representing the fact that different
humans may have different transition models. Furthermore,
their true values are unknown by the AI, and the AI has to
estimate their values during the game.
Fig. 4. The evolution of accumulated payoff of the AI player against “fake
human” players.
Fig. 5. The histogram of accumulated payoffs of “fake human” players
against the AI player using our proposed strategy.
It can be observed that the results of AI against real human
players in Figs. 2 and 3 are close to those of AI against
“fake human” players in Figs. 4 and 5, although the growth
of accumulated payoff of the AI player against real human
players is slightly slower than that against “fake human”
players. Note that the latter corresponds to the ideal case
where the “human” player’s behavior perfectly matches the
model prediction. Nevertheless, the similarity of the results
implies, indirectly, that our proposed human player’s model
may have captured some crucial features in human decision
making in the game. And in the light of this observation,
it is reasonable to envision that the proposed approach
to modeling human behavior in interactive and sequential
decision-making scenarios can find its utility in a broader
range of applications involving human-machine interactions.
VI. SUMMARY
By leveraging cognitive hierarchy theory and Bayesian
learning, our AI algorithm beat most human players in a
repeated penny-matching game. Our approach to modeling
human behavior in the game may be extended and used in
other applications involving human-machine interactions.
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